

Extreme Climatic Events, Trade Liberalization, and Civil Strife

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Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between civil strife and extreme climatic events through their impact on local food prices and availability. Theoretically, it looks at how water scarcity affects local food production and prices and how that, along with tariffs on agricultural products, affect the decision to protest. Empirically, using a Poisson model, the article tests the impact of tariffs and droughts, based on their length and severity, on the number of peaceful and violent protests. The main finding of the paper is that there is a strong relationship between droughts and civil strife, and this relationship depends on the length and severity of the drought. A severe short-term drought is found to increase peaceful protests whereas a moderate medium-term drought increases both peaceful and violent demonstrations. On the other hand, a long-term drought increases riots; the magnitude of the impact is increasing in the severity of the drought. Additionally, an increase in the ad valorem tariff imposed on a heavily imported agricultural product is found to increase the number of monthly riots when the country is experiencing a drought. (*JEL* Q34, Q2)

Keywords: Civil Strife; Droughts; Trade.

A. Introduction

Climate change is affecting our lives in many ways, and its effect is increasing daily, although it varies from one region to another. One of the clear impacts of climate change is on the variation of precipitation rates and temperatures in high and low latitude countries. It is also expected to increase the number of extreme events like floods and droughts which will drastically disturb agricultural production in affected areas (Babel, Agarwal, and Shinde 2014). Although world food supply may remain intact under *some* of the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the next few decades, developing countries are expected to bear the brunt of climate change as their agricultural productivity is expected to decline significantly (Parry et al. 2004; Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). This will lead to an increase in local food prices in developing countries and make them more vulnerable to changes in world food prices as their expected increase in food import dependency will come with an increase in international price transmission to local consumers (Bekkers et al. 2017). The increase in the price transmission will intensify local consumers' sensitivity and responsiveness to changes in global food prices. One way to express this intensified sensitivity is through social unrest, either peacefully or violently. The two recent spikes in world food prices, for example, caused food riots in Africa in 2008 (Berazneva and Lee 2013) and were a major contributing factor that led to the Arab Spring in 2011 (Maystadt, Tan, and Breisinger 2014) which eventually led to two of the deadliest civil wars in modern history in Syria and Yemen.

Aside from the major spikes in food prices, even a smaller increase in the world food price index (FPI) causes an increase in social unrest, especially when the country suffers from a natural disaster in the same month in which the FPI increases (Bellemare 2014). Nonetheless, the effect of the change in FPI on social unrest is heterogenous based on the country's regime type

and level of income. Low income countries and democracies and semi-democracies are more likely to experience civil strife as FPI increases; no such effect was found in high income countries and autocracies (Arezki and Brückner 2011; Hendrix and Haggard 2015). Besides affecting social unrest through an increase in world food prices, climate change in itself is also associated with an increase in social unrest. An increase in rainfall deviations, for instance, increases the likelihood of civil wars and insurgencies (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). But even at a smaller level, Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013) surveyed the literature of quantitative studies on the relationship between climate change and different types of human conflict, ranging from interpersonal conflict to civil wars, and concluded that for each standard deviation change in climate, interpersonal violence increases by 4 percent, on average, while intergroup conflict increases by 14 percent.

These studies tell us two important things. First, climate change is correlated with conflict, although it may not be the primary source of it. Second, climate change will lower future agricultural production in developing countries (i.e., low-income countries), which will increase social unrest in these countries. So, in a nutshell, the studies serve as a warning of an expected increase in conflict and social unrest in the future. The goal of this paper is to study the impact of climate change on civil strife through studying the mechanism through which an increase in extreme climatic events can increase peaceful and violent protests. Additionally, this paper investigates the role of trade liberalization as an effective tool to cope with climate change and lower civil strife. The theoretical model of this paper focuses on how extreme climatic events affect people's decision to demonstrate. The empirical model tests their effect on the number of peaceful and violent demonstrations every month. Since two of the main methods that countries use to cope with food insecurity are increasing food imports and banning food exports

(Demeke, Pangrazio, and Maetz 2008), I study the effectiveness of trade liberalization as a coping mechanism and how it impacts social unrest when experiencing extreme climatic events. In the future, I will include export trade policies in the analysis as well. The importance of endogenizing trade policies in the model is to provide stronger policy implications as governments typically have control over their own trade policies but not over world prices.

The analysis conducted here resulted in several interesting findings. First, severe short-term droughts are positively associated with more peaceful protests while severe medium- and long-term droughts are associated with more riots. Moderate medium-term droughts are associated with an increase in the number of both peaceful and violent demonstrations while long-term droughts are only associated with an increase in riots. Second, riots tend to increase when imposing an ad valorem tariff on a heavily imported agricultural good while experiencing a drought; the magnitude of the effect increases as the severity of the drought increases. Third, both peaceful and violent demonstrations decline when imposing a tariff on a heavily exported product while experiencing a severe drought. Furthermore, when experiencing a moderate drought, peaceful protests tend to increase.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section outlines the theoretical model that studies people's decision to participate in protests and explains how water supply and food accessibility influence that decision. The third section presents the empirical model and data used to explore the relationship between extreme climatic events, trade policies, and civil strife. The fourth section discusses the results and the fifth section concludes with further steps to extend the paper.

B. Theoretical Model

B.A. Activists' Political Activity

Assume that there is a controversial issue, V , that a large group of people, N , wants while the government is hesitant to provide.¹ Let there be a small group of activists, \mathcal{A} , who dearly care about V and who are able to organize themselves and overcome the free-rider problem. If \mathcal{A} decided to organize a protest to demand V , the probability of success of their protest in attaining V is $P_{\mathcal{A}}$. If the activists organize a protest, O , they will get utility as they feel that they are doing their part, $u_{\mathcal{A}}(O) > 0$; if they choose to be politically inactive, I , they will be dissatisfied and get disutility, $d_{\mathcal{A}}(I) > 0$. Typically, political activists, especially those who organize peaceful protests, are known to the public. As a result, they might be targeted either by the government, government supporters, or opponents of V . Additionally, organizing the protest itself might be time consuming. Thus, the activists will bear a cost of $c_{\mathcal{A}}(O) > 0$ if they organize the protest. The activists' decision to organize a demonstration is contingent on the following inequality:

$$U_{\mathcal{A}}(O) \geq U_{\mathcal{A}}(I) \Leftrightarrow U_{\mathcal{A}}(O) = P_{\mathcal{A}}V + u_{\mathcal{A}}(O) - c_{\mathcal{A}}(O) \geq -d_{\mathcal{A}}(I) = U_{\mathcal{A}}(I)$$

The activists will organize a protest if the utility from being politically active and the probability of success, assuming only the activists will show up to the protest², exceed the cost of protesting minus the disutility from being politically inactive.

B.B. Participation versus Free-Riding Decision

Let us assume that the activists' decision is to organize a protest. Let there be an N number of people from the population who also care about V , and, in principle, do not mind protesting to demand V . Assuming that V is a public good, they would benefit if the government provides it regardless of whether they participate in the protest or not. If i decides to participate, his utility

¹ This is based on Finkel, Muller and Opp (1989) Personal Influence model in which they assume that individual's decision to participate is based on their personal influence on the probability of success of the protest.

² In reality, many political activists have organized demonstrations expecting large numbers of people to show up only to find out in the day of the protest that the majority decided to free-ride. As a result, assuming that the activists will make their decision based on the assumption that no one else will show up seems like a realistic assumption.

will be $U_i(A) = (P_{\mathcal{A}} + P_n + P_i)V + u_i(A, R_i) - c_i(A)$. $c_i(A)$ here can be expressed in the form of an expected utility function in which the cost function itself will depend on the probability of different outcomes occurring. When i decides to participate in a protest, they will be facing different outcomes of participation based on the regime type and the behavior of those who oppose the protest or issue demanded. Typically, the protester will always expect, to some degree, that nothing will happen to him in retaliation for participating in the protest; in this case the only cost that i will bear is the cost of physically being in the protest (e.g., time or income forgone). The cost that i incurs can be represented as c^n while the probability of nothing else happening is ψ^n . On the other hand, i could face some additional negative outcomes such as being attacked, c^a , jailed, c^j , or killed, c^k , while protesting. The probabilities of these outcomes depend on the brutality of the police force and the history of the regime's treatment of demonstrators or opposition in the past. The probability of being attacked or beaten up while protesting is ψ^a while the probabilities of being jailed or killed are ψ^j and ψ^k , respectively. Thus, $c_i(A) = \psi^n c_i^n + \psi^a c_i^a + \psi^j c_i^j + \psi^k c_i^k$ where $c_i^n < c_i^a < c_i^j < c_i^k$. In contrast, if i decides to free-ride, his utility will be $U_i(I) = (P_{\mathcal{A}} + P_n)V - d_i(I, R_i)$. P_n is the demonstration's probability of success which increases as the number of protesters, $n \in [0, N]$, increases. P_i is the marginal probability of success if individual i decides to participate, which is very close to zero, so we can ignore it for the purposes of this model. R_i is i 's resentment level towards the government.

i will participate in a protest if and only if

$$U_i(A) \geq U_i(I) \Leftrightarrow u_i(A, R_i) + d_i(I, R_i) \geq \psi^n c_i^n + \psi^a c_i^a + \psi^j c_i^j + \psi^k c_i^k$$

In other words, i 's decision to participate neither depends on the probability of success of the protest nor on the number of other protesters. Instead, it depends on his resentment level

towards the government and the cost that he bears if he participates. So, holding everything else constant, i is more likely to participate when the cost of participation, $c_i(A)$, decreases or when the resentment level, R_i , increases. Being unemployed, for example, lowers the cost of participation, c^n , while increasing the democracy level of the regime increases the probability of having free speech, ψ^n , and lowers the probabilities of being attacked, ψ^a , jailed, ψ^j , or killed, ψ^k . An authoritarian regime, for instance, that is well-known for its police brutality will increase the cost of protesting ($\psi^n \downarrow$ while $\psi^a, \psi^j, \psi^k \uparrow$). Nonetheless, even when police brutality is high, if i 's resentment level increases, he will be more likely to participate as was seen in the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia at the end of 2010 (in which ψ^a was high) and the Egyptian Revolution in early 2011 (in which ψ^j and ψ^k increased significantly). To summarize the determinants of i 's decision to participate in a protest: his opportunity cost is important, but so is the physical cost that he might endure if the police is brutal, or the financial cost that he will bear if he gets arrested. His resentment level towards the government is also an important determinant. If i is not satisfied with the governments' other policies, he is more likely to take advantage of the already organized protest and display his dissatisfaction to the government. On the other hand, even if i cares about V , if he is very satisfied with the government and personally benefits from many of its other policies (i.e., R_i is low), then he is more likely to 'let it slide' and free-ride on an issue that he cares about.

The resentment level, R_i , is a function of many variables including the level of freedom, personal income, employment status, purchasing power, food accessibility, availability of public goods (especially those that i needs), political ideologies, etc. Some of these variables are individual factors that are specific to i , while others are group factors that affect all, or a large proportion of, members of N in similar ways and, therefore, affect the number of participants,

$n \in N$, which affects P_n . Assume that N comprises two groups: farmers, F , and consumers or buyers, B . In general, if one of these variables affects the entire group rather than just a few individuals, the group's resentment level will increase. Therefore, holding everything else constant, the group members will be more likely to participate in the demonstration as more individuals will find it optimal to participate rather than free-ride.

Food accessibility is one of the factors that affect the groups' resentment level through different channels. If the country was experiencing a drought, this will present a supply shock to local food production as it will decline significantly, which will increase local food prices. If the country is autarky, the drought will limit consumers' food accessibility and increase their resentment level towards the government, $R_{i \in B} \uparrow$; $R_{i \in B}$ is increasing in the severity of the drought. The drought could also increase farmers' resentment levels as their income will decrease due to the decline in their production; nonetheless, if government intervention is limited, farmers will still be able to make some profit as food supply will be low while food demand will be high. In this case, the impact on $R_{i \in F}$ depends on the severity of the drought. If the drought is moderate, total food production will be lower, but most farmers will still be able to sell their yield at higher prices in absence of government intervention; thus, $R_{i \in F}$ will decrease. If the drought is severe, but is concentrated in one region of the country, farmers affected by the severe drought will have an increase in their resentment level as their income will decline significantly. In contrast, those that are not affected by the drought will have a decrease in their resentment level as food quantity will decrease while their yield will be unaffected so they will be able to charge higher prices which will increase their income. If the drought is extreme or severe and evenly distributed across the country, farmers' income will be negatively affected; therefore, their resentment level, $R_{i \in F}$, will increase.

If trade is allowed, consumers will be more likely to turn to food imports to substitute for the limited, yet expensive, local food supply. In this case, if tariff levels are high, consumers' resentment level will increase as they will perceive the government to be deliberately controlling their food access, $R_{i \in B} \uparrow$. On the other hand, farmers will be satisfied with the government's protection of their profit, so their resentment level will decline, $R_{i \in F} \downarrow$. If the government were to cut tariffs, the consumers will feel that their government cares about their welfare, so their resentment level will decline, $R_{i \in B} \downarrow$, while farmers' resentment level will increase, $R_{i \in F} \uparrow$. If the government chooses to set an export quota, consumers' resentment level will decline even further as they will view the government to be doing all that it can do to limit the negative effects of a natural disaster over which they have no control; $R_{i \in B} \downarrow$. Farmers, on the contrary, will view the government to be coming after their personal income which will increase their resentment level; $R_{i \in F} \uparrow$.

From the last few paragraphs, the following hypotheses are derived:

Hypothesis 1: Droughts are associated with an increase in demonstrations.

- **H1.1:** Consumers' demonstrations are increasing in the severity of the drought.
- **H1.2:** Farmers' demonstrations depend on both the severity and the distribution of the drought across the country.
 - **H1.2.1:** Demonstrations will increase when a severe or an extreme drought affects most farmers of a region.
 - **H1.2.2:** Demonstrations will decrease if the drought is local or only has a partial effect on food production.

Hypothesis 2: Trade policies have an important impact on the number of demonstrations.

- **H2.1:** Trade liberalization tend to decrease consumers' demonstrations.

- **H2.1.1:** The impact on farmers' demonstrations is either insignificant or positive, depending on the political power of farmers as an organized group.
- **H2.2:** Export quotas will lower consumers' demonstrations but are likely to increase farmers' demonstrations.
 - **H2.2.1:** Farmers are less likely to demonstrate as the severity of the drought increases.

C. Empirical Model

Although the relationship between civil strife and food prices has been the focus of many empirical studies, none of them, to my knowledge, integrated climate change in their analysis. Additionally, none of them studied the impact of agricultural tariffs on civil strife in the presence of a drought. To analyze these relations, I use a Poisson Model in which the dependent variable is either the number of peaceful or violent demonstrations in each month. The Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) is used to determine the level of a drought at different timescales (1-24 months). I use a binary variable for each drought level as the magnitude of their impact is expected to be heterogenous. I also distinguish between agricultural products that are heavily imported or exported. The following specification is used:

$$\begin{aligned}
protest_{smy} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \tau_{psy}^f + \beta_2 \tau_{psy}^f * moderate(t)_{smy} + \beta_3 \tau_{psy}^f * severe(t)_{smy} \\
& + \beta_4 \tau_{psy}^f * moderate(t)_{smy} * I(imported)_{psy} + \beta_5 \tau_{psy}^f * severe(t)_{smy} * I(imported)_{psy} \\
& + \beta_6 \tau_{psy}^f * moderate(t)_{smy} * I(exported)_{psy} + \beta_7 \tau_{psy}^f * severe(t)_{smy} * I(exported)_{psy} \\
& + \beta_8 moderate(t)_{smy} + \beta_9 severe(t)_{smy} \\
& + \delta EconomicIndicators_{sy} + \mu PoliticalIndicators_{sy} + \zeta \ln(Population_{sy}) \\
& + \phi_s FE_s + \phi_y FE_y + \phi_m FE_m + \phi_p FE_p + \epsilon_{psmy}
\end{aligned}$$

Where $protest_{smy}$ is the number of either peaceful or violent protests in each country, s , at the month level. τ_{psy}^f is the tariff level imposed on each agricultural product, p , imported into country s every year. $moderate(t)_{smy}$ and $severe(t)_{smy}$ are binary variables that indicate that the country has been experiencing a moderate or severe drought, respectively, for t months. $I_{psy}(imported)$ and $I_{psy}(exported)$ are binary variables that indicate that product p is heavily imported in country s in year y . $EconomicIndicators_{sy}$ and $PoliticalIndicators_{sy}$ include several economic and political indicators that might influence the number of protests such as GDP per capita growth, unemployment rate, democracy level, state fragility index, and military expenditures. $\ln(Population)$ is the natural log of population included to control for larger countries' propensity to see social unrest (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). FE_s, FE_y, FE_m, FE_p are state, year, month, and product fixed effects to control for any unobservables.

D. Data


For now, the analysis is limited to countries from Central America and the Caribbean; the dataset spans from 1990 to 2010. The source of peaceful and violent demonstrations data is the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012). To measure the drought level, I used the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) which is calculated using the SPI program from the World Meteorological Organization (Svoboda, Hayes, and Wood 2012) using monthly precipitation rates from the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (World Bank 2015). Per the classification used in McKee, Doesken, and Kleist (1993), the country is experiencing a severe drought if the SPI is less than -1.5^3 , and a moderate drought if the SPI is between -1.49 and -1 . The SPI was calculated at different timescales that span from 1-month to 24-month SPIs.

³ Technically, a drought is defined to be severe if the $SPI \in [-1.5, -1.99]$ and extreme if the $SPI \geq -2$. Nonetheless, only few observations in the dataset were extreme droughts so I combined the two definitions into one variable. The original definitions will be used as I add countries from Africa and Asia to the analysis.

The tariff data were collected for all the FOASTAT Commodity List (FCL). The data was downloaded from TRAINS for the corresponding Harmonized System products at the subheading level (6-digits HS) (World Bank 2016). The economic indicators used were collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database from the World Bank (World Bank 2017), while the political indicators were collected from Polity IV database (Polity IV 2012).


E. Results

The preliminary results from the empirical model specified above indicate that there is a significant relationship between tariffs, droughts, and civil strife. In the short-term, a severe drought was found to be positively associated with peaceful demonstrations and negatively associated with violent demonstrations, while the opposite is true when experiencing a severe medium- or long-term drought. Experiencing a moderate drought, on the other hand, seems to have a negative effect on the number of peaceful and violent demonstrations in the short-term, with an increase in both types of demonstrations in the medium-term, with a larger effect on riots, and an increase in riots and a decrease in peaceful demonstrations in the long-term. The following graphs show the effect of droughts on the number of demonstrations.




To study the impact of using trade to cope with food shortage due to climate change, it is important to look at the effect of an increase in the ad valorem tariff (a customs duty that is calculated as a percentage of the value of the product) on agricultural products while

experiencing a drought on the number of demonstrations. Imposing a tariff on heavily imported products while experiencing a severe drought leads to a small increase in peaceful and violent protests in the short-term, the magnitude of the effect on riots increases in the medium-term while peaceful demonstrations tend to decrease. When experiencing a severe long-term drought, both peaceful and violent demonstrations tend to increase with a larger effect on riots. In contrast, when experiencing a moderate drought, riots tend to increase in the short- and medium-term, while both peaceful and violent demonstrations tend to decrease in the long-term. The following graphs illustrate the relationship between the coefficients of the ad valorem tariff imposed on heavily imported products on the number of peaceful and violent demonstrations for different drought lengths.



The level of tariffs on heavily exported products could have an indirect effect on the number of demonstrations in a country. For example, imposing a tariff on an exported product could lead the trading partner to reciprocate and impose higher tariffs as well which increases the quantity of agricultural products in the local market as farmers might choose to sell a proportion of what otherwise would have been exported in the local market. Thus, food availability will increase while farmers profit will decrease. The results show that such tariff will lower the number of riots when experiencing a severe medium- or long-term drought and increase peaceful protests when experiencing a medium-term drought. Riots, in contrast, are more likely to

increase when experiencing a moderate short-term drought and decline as the length of the moderate drought increases. Peaceful demonstrations increase when experiencing a moderate short- and medium-term drought and decline as the length of the drought increases. The following graphs show the coefficient of the ad valorem tariff imposed on heavily exported products on the number of peaceful and violent demonstrations for different drought levels.



F. Closing Remarks

With the increase in extreme climatic events, developing countries are expected to experience an increase in peaceful and violent demonstrations due to the expected limitation in agricultural productivity and the increase in local food prices. One way to cope with this is through lowering bilateral tariffs to limit the decline in consumers' food accessibility, especially on heavily imported products. This paper investigates this issue both theoretically and empirically and backs up the aforementioned proposition.

Notwithstanding, this paper is still a work-in-progress, and more work needs to be done on the theoretical and empirical fronts. Theoretically, the current model does not factor in the government's precautionary policies to cope with droughts via public food storage. It also does not account for the farmers' political pressure and the dynamics between consumers, farmers, and the government. Empirically, the current analysis assumes that most of the participants of the protests are consumers, unless it is specifically mentioned in the news that the protesters are

farmers. One possible solution to differentiate between farmers' and consumers' protests is to use satellite data to determine whether the local region in which the protest occurred is more inhibited by farmers or urban consumers; combining vegetation coverage data with NASA's Nighttime Lights data should do the trick. Additionally, the results of the current model only show a correlation, albeit a strong one, rather than a causal relationship. More control variables need to be included and more modifications need to be undertaken to ensure that the relationship in the results is causal. For example, using an agricultural drought instead of a meteorological drought is a better way to control for local food production. Also, limited accessibility to staple foods is more likely to lead to protests while other trade policies (e.g., export quotas) might also contribute to mitigating the number of demonstrations. It would also be interesting to see what the relationship is between above average precipitation rates (i.e., wet months) and conflict and whether tariffs at this point matter. Since the available tariff data is annual, one way to control for its monthly effect is by looking at the trade volume for that month; if the country is importing excessive amounts of the product in a month, it will be more sensitive to the total price paid for that product (world price + tariff). Additionally, the data used in the analysis here is used at the country level, finding data at a smaller regional scale would be a better fit for this study, especially when studying the impact on large countries.

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Appendix

Table 1: Dependent Variable: Number of Peaceful Demonstrations in a Month								
Drought Length	1-Month	2-Month	3-Month	4-Month	5-Month	6-Month	7-Month	8-Month
Ad Valorem Tariff on Agricultural Products	-0.000334 (0.000302)	-0.0011*** (0.000331)	-0.0011*** (0.000321)	-0.0009*** (0.000312)	-0.0007** (0.000308)	-0.00061** (0.000304)	-0.00061** (0.000305)	-0.000543* (0.000300)
Tariff * Severe Drought	0.00486*** (0.000636)	0.00129*** (0.000324)	0.00125*** (0.000349)	0.00111*** (0.000407)	0.000620 (0.000402)	0.00413*** (0.000454)	0.00156 (0.00125)	0.00199 (0.00178)
Tariff * Moderate Drought	-0.0065*** (0.00115)	0.00391*** (0.000503)	0.00284** (0.00118)	0.00356*** (0.000851)	0.00239** (0.00112)	0.00246*** (0.000845)	0.00344*** (0.000477)	0.00459*** (0.000669)
Severe Drought	-0.0809** (0.0318)	0.220*** (0.0197)	0.323*** (0.0189)	0.237*** (0.0235)	-0.061*** (0.0183)	-0.332*** (0.0271)	0.235*** (0.0323)	0.0138 (0.0375)
Moderate Drought	0.221*** (0.0267)	-0.0901*** (0.0141)	-0.501*** (0.0235)	-0.508*** (0.0210)	0.0560** (0.0286)	-0.110*** (0.0274)	-0.169*** (0.0199)	-0.116*** (0.0218)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.00730 (0.00454)	0.00198* (0.00104)	0.00269** (0.00105)	0.00313** (0.00131)	0.00276** (0.00116)	-0.00125 (0.00121)	-0.0393*** (0.0102)	-0.0245** (0.0112)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.00405** (0.00205)	0.00957*** (0.00134)	0.0142*** (0.00102)	0.0152*** (0.00110)	-0.012*** (0.00457)	-0.0257** (0.0104)	0.0326*** (0.00783)	0.00281 (0.0114)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.0367** (0.0148)	0.000436 (0.00112)	0.0404*** (0.00576)	0.0214*** (0.00494)	0.00457 (0.00684)	-0.0135 (0.00946)	0.00209 (0.00215)	0.0183*** (0.00328)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	0.00335** (0.00169)	-0.0075*** (0.00142)	0.00397*** (0.00146)	-0.0240*** (0.00560)	0.0116*** (0.00145)	0.0102*** (0.00124)	0.00203 (0.00157)	0.000671 (0.00117)
Polity IV Score	1.350*** (0.0402)	1.336*** (0.0403)	1.360*** (0.0404)	1.380*** (0.0406)	1.343*** (0.0404)	1.363*** (0.0405)	1.344*** (0.0403)	1.337*** (0.0404)
GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.0914*** (0.00673)	-0.0998*** (0.00677)	-0.102*** (0.00699)	-0.0986*** (0.00694)	-0.091*** (0.00690)	-0.0959*** (0.00685)	-0.0908*** (0.00688)	-0.0927*** (0.00688)
Military Expenditures	0.334*** (0.103)	0.333*** (0.101)	0.522*** (0.106)	0.521*** (0.106)	0.328*** (0.103)	0.489*** (0.104)	0.283*** (0.103)	0.368*** (0.104)
Unemployment Rate	0.216*** (0.0162)	0.213*** (0.0163)	0.228*** (0.0165)	0.233*** (0.0166)	0.216*** (0.0163)	0.221*** (0.0163)	0.218*** (0.0162)	0.216*** (0.0163)
State Fragility Index	0.599*** (0.0183)	0.592*** (0.0186)	0.598*** (0.0187)	0.608*** (0.0187)	0.594*** (0.0185)	0.605*** (0.0186)	0.591*** (0.0184)	0.590*** (0.0185)
Log(Population)	14.45*** (0.726)	13.86*** (0.721)	14.23*** (0.741)	14.94*** (0.744)	14.56*** (0.731)	14.15*** (0.730)	15.08*** (0.731)	14.49*** (0.731)
Constant	-236.0*** (11.17)	-226.9*** (11.11)	-232.7*** (11.41)	-243.8*** (11.46)	-237.5*** (11.26)	-231.6*** (11.24)	-245.4*** (11.26)	-236.5*** (11.25)
Observations	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Dependent Variable: Number of Peaceful Demonstrations in a Month								
Drought Length	9-Month	10-Month	11-Month	12-Month	13-Month	14-Month	15-Month	16-Month
Ad Valorem Tariff on Agricultural Products	-0.000218 (0.000296)	-0.000302 (0.000298)	-0.000284 (0.000298)	-0.000362 (0.000299)	-0.000182 (0.000297)	-0.000358 (0.000298)	-0.000269 (0.000295)	-0.000403 (0.000298)
Tariff * Severe Drought	0.00462*** (0.00172)	-0.000732 (0.00173)	0.00653*** (0.000784)	0.00626*** (0.000659)	0.00456*** (0.000821)	-0.00257 (0.00248)	-0.00282 (0.00421)	-0.00931 (0.00732)
Tariff * Moderate Drought	0.000980 (0.00100)	0.00203*** (0.000779)	-0.0096*** (0.00292)	-0.00237 (0.00149)	-0.000210 (0.00143)	0.00145 (0.00105)	-0.00298 (0.00200)	0.00378*** (0.00133)
Severe Drought	-0.162*** (0.0303)	0.148*** (0.0283)	0.0701*** (0.0231)	0.0612*** (0.0215)	-0.133*** (0.0253)	-0.0261 (0.0313)	-0.0770** (0.0362)	-0.0777* (0.0462)
Moderate Drought	0.146*** (0.0220)	0.198*** (0.0184)	0.216*** (0.0212)	0.378*** (0.0202)	0.0263 (0.0195)	0.0558*** (0.0180)	-0.166*** (0.0191)	-0.178*** (0.0189)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.0247*** (0.00770)	-0.0108 (0.00792)	0.0118** (0.00593)	0.00225 (0.00378)	-0.0114* (0.00581)	-0.021*** (0.00691)	-0.026*** (0.00905)	-0.0177* (0.00936)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	-0.275*** (0.0389)	0.0291*** (0.00987)	-0.0172*** (0.00180)	-0.00113 (0.000939)	-0.195*** (0.0271)	0.0138 (0.0109)	0.00657 (0.00428)	0.0194*** (0.00696)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.0176** (0.00717)	0.00255 (0.00304)	0.0162*** (0.00417)	0.0113*** (0.00392)	-0.00612 (0.00408)	0.00686** (0.00290)	0.0250*** (0.00377)	-0.00142 (0.00334)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.000697 (0.00141)	-0.00305** (0.00122)	0.00953*** (0.00301)	0.000254 (0.00186)	0.000392 (0.00156)	0.000275 (0.00122)	0.000830 (0.00211)	-0.00285* (0.00149)
Polity IV Score	1.341*** (0.0405)	1.341*** (0.0405)	1.356*** (0.0403)	1.371*** (0.0405)	1.312*** (0.0404)	1.321*** (0.0407)	1.325*** (0.0406)	1.330*** (0.0412)
GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.0918*** (0.00686)	-0.0877*** (0.00687)	-0.0861*** (0.00692)	-0.0825*** (0.00698)	-0.0937*** (0.00690)	-0.091*** (0.00694)	-0.097*** (0.00688)	-0.0984*** (0.00690)
Military Expenditures	0.381*** (0.104)	0.319*** (0.102)	0.328*** (0.102)	0.420*** (0.102)	0.376*** (0.103)	0.342*** (0.103)	0.355*** (0.102)	0.438*** (0.102)
Unemployment Rate	0.219*** (0.0163)	0.222*** (0.0163)	0.225*** (0.0163)	0.238*** (0.0164)	0.212*** (0.0162)	0.215*** (0.0163)	0.209*** (0.0161)	0.212*** (0.0162)
State Fragility Index	0.597*** (0.0186)	0.597*** (0.0184)	0.603*** (0.0184)	0.625*** (0.0185)	0.582*** (0.0184)	0.587*** (0.0185)	0.581*** (0.0185)	0.586*** (0.0190)
Log(Population)	14.33*** (0.733)	14.40*** (0.735)	14.24*** (0.735)	13.71*** (0.750)	14.13*** (0.726)	14.16*** (0.730)	14.71*** (0.720)	14.78*** (0.718)
Constant	-234.0*** (11.29)	-235.2*** (11.32)	-233.0*** (11.32)	-225.2*** (11.54)	-230.7*** (11.18)	-231.3*** (11.24)	-239.5*** (11.10)	-240.6*** (11.07)
Observations	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Dependent Variable: Number of Peaceful Demonstrations in a Month								
Drought Length	17-Month	18-Month	19-Month	20-Month	21-Month	22-Month	23-Month	24-Month
Ad Valorem Tariff on Agricultural Products	-0.000413 (0.000297)	-0.0006** (0.000301)	-0.000371 (0.000299)	-0.000417 (0.000294)	-0.000561* (0.000302)	-0.000572* (0.000302)	-0.000338 (0.000321)	-0.000235 (0.000316)
Tariff * Severe Drought	0.000183 (0.00551)	-0.028*** (0.00432)	-0.00503 (0.00411)	-0.0328*** (0.00452)	-0.0228*** (0.00880)	-0.00422 (0.00586)	-0.00650 (0.00567)	0.0142*** (0.00515)
Tariff * Moderate Drought	0.00689*** (0.00140)	0.0104*** (0.00140)	0.00651*** (0.00133)	0.00969*** (0.00181)	0.00604*** (0.000592)	0.00440*** (0.000402)	0.000320 (0.000334)	-0.00084** (0.000365)
Severe Drought	-0.246*** (0.0412)	-0.248*** (0.0416)	0.0310 (0.0320)	-0.269*** (0.0356)	-0.229*** (0.0417)	-0.0109 (0.0335)	-0.103*** (0.0381)	0.141*** (0.0342)
Moderate Drought	-0.00950 (0.0193)	-0.274*** (0.0212)	-0.454*** (0.0220)	-0.577*** (0.0213)	-0.0305* (0.0179)	0.0322* (0.0181)	0.430*** (0.0138)	0.290*** (0.0143)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	-0.0151* (0.00829)	-0.0140** (0.00588)	-0.0106** (0.00534)	-0.0164*** (0.00597)	-0.0219** (0.00983)	-0.0130 (0.00847)	0.0295*** (0.00743)	-3.19e-05 (0.00737)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.0122** (0.00525)	0.0466*** (0.0101)	-0.00436 (0.0116)	0.0289*** (0.0107)	0.0351*** (0.00840)	0.0165*** (0.00565)	0.0138 (0.0104)	-0.0554*** (0.0112)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.0087*** (0.00289)	-0.011*** (0.00349)	-0.0236*** (0.00727)	0.00191 (0.00365)	0.000178 (0.00175)	-0.00381* (0.00207)	-0.00372* (0.00194)	-0.00129 (0.00143)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.0072*** (0.00151)	-0.007*** (0.00147)	-0.0042*** (0.00143)	-0.0082*** (0.00202)	-0.0075*** (0.000958)	-0.0086*** (0.00140)	0.000867 (0.000603)	0.00457*** (0.000557)
Polity IV Score	1.250*** (0.0411)	1.240*** (0.0422)	1.447*** (0.0417)	1.259*** (0.0405)	1.236*** (0.0406)	1.327*** (0.0414)	1.229*** (0.0403)	1.370*** (0.0406)
GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.0914*** (0.00681)	-0.098*** (0.00681)	-0.107*** (0.00694)	-0.105*** (0.00678)	-0.0903*** (0.00689)	-0.0916*** (0.00693)	-0.065*** (0.00695)	-0.0752*** (0.00702)
Military Expenditures	0.368*** (0.102)	0.475*** (0.101)	0.383*** (0.102)	0.478*** (0.106)	0.503*** (0.107)	0.370*** (0.105)	0.509*** (0.110)	0.399*** (0.106)
Unemployment Rate	0.199*** (0.0162)	0.201*** (0.0161)	0.227*** (0.0160)	0.199*** (0.0159)	0.205*** (0.0162)	0.216*** (0.0163)	0.221*** (0.0165)	0.229*** (0.0164)
State Fragility Index	0.550*** (0.0191)	0.553*** (0.0190)	0.630*** (0.0190)	0.553*** (0.0185)	0.554*** (0.0189)	0.588*** (0.0191)	0.543*** (0.0190)	0.593*** (0.0191)
Log(Population)	14.06*** (0.716)	14.69*** (0.719)	15.86*** (0.713)	15.65*** (0.705)	14.22*** (0.724)	14.37*** (0.737)	12.65*** (0.755)	14.01*** (0.749)
Constant	-228.8*** (11.03)	-238.1*** (11.11)	-258.3*** (11.00)	-252.7*** (10.86)	-231.1*** (11.14)	-234.5*** (11.35)	-207.6*** (11.61)	-229.6*** (11.52)
Observations	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Dependent Variable: Number of Violent Demonstrations in a Month								
Drought Length	1-Month	2-Month	3-Month	4-Month	5-Month	6-Month	7-Month	8-Month
Ad Valorem Tariff on Agricultural Products	0.000104 (0.000330)	-0.000142 (0.000332)	-0.000386 (0.000333)	-0.000402 (0.000326)	-0.000419 (0.000348)	-0.000282 (0.000339)	-0.000342 (0.000336)	-9.39e-05 (0.000328)
Tariff * Severe Drought	0.00381** (0.00187)	0.00249*** (0.000706)	-0.00375*** (0.00118)	-0.00301*** (0.00113)	0.000850 (0.000542)	0.00125* (0.000759)	0.00878*** (0.00102)	0.00691*** (0.00170)
Tariff * Moderate Drought	-0.0087*** (0.00198)	-0.0093*** (0.00167)	0.00582*** (0.00158)	-0.00431 (0.00295)	-0.0247*** (0.00595)	-0.00849*** (0.00325)	-0.00453*** (0.00172)	-0.00573** (0.00229)
Severe Drought	-1.169*** (0.0364)	-0.492*** (0.0214)	-0.247*** (0.0242)	-0.271*** (0.0250)	0.259*** (0.0197)	0.287*** (0.0347)	0.805*** (0.0281)	0.446*** (0.0346)
Moderate Drought	0.347*** (0.0176)	-0.241*** (0.0184)	-0.673*** (0.0233)	-0.646*** (0.0239)	0.0514** (0.0206)	-0.0444** (0.0225)	-0.234*** (0.0184)	0.310*** (0.0165)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.0139*** (0.00474)	-0.00511 (0.00336)	0.00531* (0.00273)	0.0102*** (0.00306)	0.00209 (0.00184)	-0.0393* (0.0238)	-0.0563*** (0.00581)	-0.0552*** (0.00682)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.00376 (0.00268)	0.00167 (0.00181)	0.0140*** (0.00137)	0.0139*** (0.00135)	-0.00754 (0.00481)	0.0295*** (0.00412)	0.0689*** (0.0100)	0.103*** (0.0107)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	0.00379 (0.00422)	0.0118*** (0.00360)	0.0145*** (0.00468)	0.0244*** (0.00571)	0.0324*** (0.00630)	0.0387*** (0.00503)	0.0148*** (0.00374)	-0.0113** (0.00444)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	0.00140 (0.00210)	0.0101*** (0.00187)	-0.00154 (0.00216)	0.00317 (0.00404)	0.0312*** (0.00588)	0.0112*** (0.00318)	0.00459** (0.00228)	0.00391 (0.00246)
Polity IV Score	1.703*** (0.0544)	1.708*** (0.0554)	1.741*** (0.0547)	1.744*** (0.0551)	1.672*** (0.0543)	1.665*** (0.0543)	1.694*** (0.0538)	1.736*** (0.0543)
GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.0761*** (0.00767)	-0.0938*** (0.00782)	-0.106*** (0.00771)	-0.101*** (0.00773)	-0.0950*** (0.00770)	-0.0937*** (0.00771)	-0.0804*** (0.00769)	-0.0946*** (0.00784)
Military Expenditures	2.900*** (0.0774)	3.114*** (0.0798)	3.345*** (0.0802)	3.322*** (0.0816)	2.922*** (0.0807)	2.909*** (0.0808)	2.534*** (0.0802)	2.794*** (0.0807)
Unemployment Rate	0.281*** (0.0168)	0.258*** (0.0176)	0.266*** (0.0178)	0.278*** (0.0180)	0.250*** (0.0176)	0.251*** (0.0175)	0.256*** (0.0177)	0.259*** (0.0175)
State Fragility Index	0.555*** (0.0195)	0.543*** (0.0200)	0.562*** (0.0198)	0.564*** (0.0200)	0.519*** (0.0197)	0.515*** (0.0197)	0.521*** (0.0194)	0.543*** (0.0197)
Log(Population)	39.08*** (0.902)	39.66*** (0.925)	39.85*** (0.926)	40.42*** (0.932)	39.38*** (0.901)	39.41*** (0.903)	41.75*** (0.918)	41.29*** (0.921)
Constant	-611.8*** (14.05)	-620.5*** (14.40)	-623.7*** (14.42)	-632.4*** (14.51)	-615.7*** (14.03)	-616.2*** (14.06)	-651.7*** (14.28)	-645.4*** (14.32)
Observations	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Dependent Variable: Number of Violent Demonstrations in a Month								
Drought Length	9-Month	10-Month	11-Month	12-Month	13-Month	14-Month	15-Month	16-Month
Ad Valorem Tariff on Agricultural Products	9.96e-05 (0.000328)	-3.83e-05 (0.000329)	0.000261 (0.000326)	0.000111 (0.000331)	0.000260 (0.000331)	0.000368 (0.000328)	0.000162 (0.000328)	0.000296 (0.000333)
Tariff * Severe Drought	0.00535*** (0.00187)	0.00511*** (0.00184)	0.00156 (0.00191)	-0.00331 (0.00218)	-0.0150*** (0.00508)	-0.0168*** (0.00613)	-0.00780* (0.00433)	-0.0219*** (0.00832)
Tariff * Moderate Drought	-0.0163*** (0.00398)	-0.0122*** (0.00321)	-0.0278*** (0.00848)	-0.00362 (0.00234)	-0.0166*** (0.00491)	-0.0296*** (0.00765)	-0.00805*** (0.00266)	-0.00709*** (0.00213)
Severe Drought	0.302*** (0.0338)	0.324*** (0.0342)	0.367*** (0.0298)	0.123*** (0.0287)	0.0394 (0.0356)	0.269*** (0.0413)	-0.0818** (0.0318)	0.411*** (0.0345)
Moderate Drought	0.435*** (0.0194)	0.216*** (0.0190)	0.433*** (0.0221)	0.510*** (0.0198)	0.126*** (0.0215)	0.267*** (0.0205)	0.161*** (0.0182)	0.322*** (0.0187)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	-0.0365*** (0.0101)	-0.0462*** (0.0105)	-0.0198** (0.00835)	-0.0121 (0.00865)	-0.0290*** (0.00999)	-0.0637*** (0.0123)	-0.0235** (0.0103)	-0.0170 (0.0108)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.0369*** (0.0140)	0.0957*** (0.0111)	-0.0192*** (0.00422)	0.0106*** (0.00216)	-0.152*** (0.0425)	0.111*** (0.0117)	0.0102** (0.00418)	0.0195** (0.00802)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.0230*** (0.00601)	-0.00619 (0.00463)	-0.0171** (0.00865)	-0.0464*** (0.00558)	-0.0223*** (0.00643)	-0.0130* (0.00732)	-0.000476 (0.00357)	-0.0131*** (0.00365)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	0.0165*** (0.00395)	0.0115*** (0.00323)	0.0280*** (0.00832)	0.00353 (0.00235)	0.0174*** (0.00483)	0.0283*** (0.00750)	0.00167 (0.00281)	0.00470** (0.00214)
Polity IV Score	1.761*** (0.0545)	1.728*** (0.0546)	1.758*** (0.0541)	1.758*** (0.0545)	1.695*** (0.0545)	1.740*** (0.0547)	1.671*** (0.0545)	1.771*** (0.0541)
GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.0932*** (0.00784)	-0.0937*** (0.00778)	-0.0859*** (0.00780)	-0.0866*** (0.00780)	-0.0966*** (0.00756)	-0.0914*** (0.00752)	-0.0926*** (0.00760)	-0.0857*** (0.00761)
Military Expenditures	2.764*** (0.0781)	2.829*** (0.0790)	2.844*** (0.0785)	3.042*** (0.0802)	3.029*** (0.0800)	2.950*** (0.0799)	2.943*** (0.0801)	2.859*** (0.0826)
Unemployment Rate	0.270*** (0.0177)	0.261*** (0.0177)	0.269*** (0.0178)	0.276*** (0.0179)	0.257*** (0.0177)	0.265*** (0.0178)	0.255*** (0.0176)	0.265*** (0.0180)
State Fragility Index	0.558*** (0.0197)	0.543*** (0.0197)	0.555*** (0.0195)	0.572*** (0.0197)	0.536*** (0.0198)	0.554*** (0.0198)	0.525*** (0.0198)	0.558*** (0.0198)
Log(Population)	40.88*** (0.926)	40.02*** (0.921)	40.62*** (0.932)	40.32*** (0.939)	39.42*** (0.914)	39.88*** (0.936)	38.77*** (0.912)	40.84*** (0.935)
Constant	-639.5*** (14.42)	-626.1*** (14.33)	-635.5*** (14.50)	-631.2*** (14.61)	-616.7*** (14.23)	-624.2*** (14.57)	-606.6*** (14.20)	-639.1*** (14.54)
Observations	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Dependent Variable: Number of Violent Demonstrations in a Month								
Drought Length	17-Month	18-Month	19-Month	20-Month	21-Month	22-Month	23-Month	24-Month
Ad Valorem Tariff on Agricultural Products	-0.000107 (0.000340)	-8.62e-05 (0.000333)	-0.000487 (0.000324)	-0.000388 (0.000315)	-0.000247 (0.000319)	0.000325 (0.000315)	0.000559* (0.000333)	-4.74e-05 (0.000351)
Tariff * Severe Drought	-0.0356*** (0.00836)	-0.0554*** (0.00531)	-0.0141*** (0.00440)	-0.0672*** (0.00550)	-0.0786*** (0.00961)	-0.0569*** (0.00802)	-0.110*** (0.00587)	-0.0950*** (0.00635)
Tariff * Moderate Drought	0.00945*** (0.00158)	0.00626*** (0.00161)	0.00652*** (0.00147)	0.00912*** (0.00173)	0.00134 (0.00141)	-0.00940*** (0.00205)	-0.00424*** (0.000918)	0.000451 (0.000446)
Severe Drought	0.559*** (0.0316)	0.439*** (0.0335)	0.997*** (0.0300)	0.409*** (0.0306)	0.616*** (0.0293)	0.369*** (0.0246)	0.767*** (0.0255)	0.646*** (0.0269)
Moderate Drought	0.134*** (0.0196)	0.112*** (0.0195)	0.241*** (0.0243)	0.257*** (0.0248)	0.516*** (0.0267)	-0.209*** (0.0245)	0.155*** (0.0186)	0.244*** (0.0157)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	-0.0119 (0.00869)	-0.0195*** (0.00630)	-0.0216*** (0.00514)	-0.00162 (0.00559)	-0.00256 (0.00815)	-0.00994 (0.00639)	0.0159*** (0.00538)	0.00288 (0.00594)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Severe Drought	0.0345*** (0.00806)	0.0610*** (0.0113)	0.0566*** (0.00792)	0.0854*** (0.00829)	0.0842*** (0.00942)	0.0606*** (0.00785)	0.147*** (0.00678)	0.130*** (0.00684)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Exported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.0174*** (0.00307)	-0.00522* (0.00282)	-0.0118*** (0.00359)	-0.0125*** (0.00356)	-0.00312 (0.00321)	0.00600* (0.00351)	0.000976 (0.00219)	-0.00228 (0.00157)
Ad Valorem Tariff on Heavily Imported Agricultural Products * Moderate Drought	-0.0109*** (0.00164)	-0.00893*** (0.00167)	-0.00341** (0.00167)	-0.00678*** (0.00203)	0.00237 (0.00174)	0.00361 (0.00293)	0.00274** (0.00109)	0.000768 (0.000524)
Polity IV Score	1.892*** (0.0554)	1.828*** (0.0576)	2.145*** (0.0566)	1.770*** (0.0551)	1.814*** (0.0548)	1.832*** (0.0564)	1.955*** (0.0565)	1.891*** (0.0562)
GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.0974*** (0.00771)	-0.101*** (0.00780)	-0.107*** (0.00794)	-0.0961*** (0.00775)	-0.0929*** (0.00770)	-0.115*** (0.00784)	-0.119*** (0.00798)	-0.109*** (0.00816)
Military Expenditures	2.908*** (0.0809)	2.827*** (0.0853)	2.378*** (0.0839)	2.824*** (0.0877)	2.799*** (0.0871)	2.753*** (0.0755)	2.473*** (0.0792)	2.683*** (0.0779)
Unemployment Rate	0.287*** (0.0180)	0.281*** (0.0180)	0.318*** (0.0180)	0.270*** (0.0178)	0.281*** (0.0180)	0.280*** (0.0177)	0.314*** (0.0177)	0.299*** (0.0177)
State Fragility Index	0.610*** (0.0201)	0.593*** (0.0210)	0.693*** (0.0202)	0.574*** (0.0200)	0.596*** (0.0199)	0.597*** (0.0203)	0.665*** (0.0202)	0.632*** (0.0204)
Log(Population)	42.35*** (0.953)	41.03*** (0.963)	44.54*** (1.014)	39.86*** (0.941)	40.25*** (0.966)	40.37*** (0.922)	39.75*** (0.962)	39.48*** (0.959)
Constant	-663.2*** (14.83)	-642.6*** (15.00)	-699.3*** (15.77)	-624.3*** (14.63)	-630.8*** (15.01)	-632.5*** (14.37)	-625.0*** (14.96)	-620.0*** (14.91)
Observations	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932	112,932

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1